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INSIDER TRADING: THE ISSUER'S DISPOSITION OF AN
ALLEGED 16 (b) VIOLATION
When corporate officers are apprised of possible 16(b) liability on
the part of a fellow insider, an appropriate reaction by them en-
compasses both practical and legal considerations. In this comment
non-legal factors influencing managerial judgments are related to
precepts applied by courts in resolution of 16(b) claims. A detailed
investigation is made into the status of the common law Business
Judgment Rule in the context of insider trading.
SECTION 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 provides
that, for the purpose of deterring unfair use of insider informa-
tion, the profit realized by an "insider"2 from a "purchase and sale"
or a "sale and purchase" of any non-exempt equity security of a
corporation within a period of less than six months is recoverable
by the corporation issuing the security.8 The statute does not pro-
' 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as § 16 (b)].
2 Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a) (1964), provides that every
officer and director of a corporation required to register under the 1934 Act and every
person "who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of any class of any equity security" of such corporation is required to file with the
SEC (and if the security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) a statement of the amount of all equity securities of the issuer of which
he is the beneficial owner. After the initial statement, if any changes occur in the
beneficial ownership of a particular officer, director, or ten percent shareholder during
a particular calendar month, the "insider" involved must file, within ten days after
the close of the month, a statement detailing the changes and showing the amount of
each equity security of the corporation beneficially owned at the end of the month.
In addition to making the reports available to the Commission and the appropriate
exchanges, the SEC in a monthly Official Summary of Security Transactions and Hold-
ings compiles and publishes the information contained in the reports. These pamphlets
are widely distributed and are available at the regional offices of the Commission and
at every exchange. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1039 n.9 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
Failure to file reports as required by § 16 (a) not only tolls the statute of limitations,
see note 46 infra, but also exposes the insider to the sanctions of criminal prosecution,
see, e.g., United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742, 752-53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 871 (1960), and mandatory injunction, see, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 91,819 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The insider will not, however, incur
civil liability as there is no right of private action for damages under § 16 (a). See, e.g.,
Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,861 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Con-
tra, Kroese v. Crawford, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,262
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Section 16(b) specifies that no suit may be brought more than two years after
the profit sought to be recovered was realized. See note 31 infra. The section is
designed to prevent the profitable use of information, not available to the investing
public, obtained by insiders for their personal advantage by virtue of their position.
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hibit insider short-swing trading but only makes the profit from any
short-term transactions by an insider recoverable by the corporation.
Suit for recovery may be brought by the issuer or, upon its refusal to
institute the proceeding or failure diligently to prosecute the action,
by any owner of an equity security of the issuer.4 Nevertheless,
recovery inures to the corporation whether it or the security holder
institutes the action. The purpose of this comment is to examine
the factors usually considered by corporate officials and counsel
before charting a course of action when a 16 (b) violation or possible
violation has come to their attention. Particular attention will be
given the issue of whether corporate officers' failure to pursue a
16 (b) claim may amount to a breach of a common law fiduciary duty.
In many situations a corporation will disfavor insider speculative
trading in its securities because of the danger that corporation policies
may be perverted by insiders in order to create market conditions
favorable to rapid trading.5 Nevertheless, the issuer's management
upon notification of possible insider liability may be reluctant to
institute a section 16 (b) proceeding, for some applications of section
16 (b), as enacted by Congress and developed by the courts, have
S. Rm. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), states: "Among the most vicious prac-
tices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of
their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions
of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid
them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the un-
scrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not
officers and directors, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies
to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others."
Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, insiders' profits arising out of
speculation in securities of their own companies were accepted as a usual emolument,
and insiders were relatively free to trade in these securities. For a discussion of the
common law liability of insiders see Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate In-
siders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CoRxuLau L.Q. 53, 53-66 (1960), and Yourd, Trading in
Securities by Directors, Oficers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act, 38 Micyr. L. REv. 133, 139-43 (1939).
"'Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in
the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such
suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same there-
after .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1964). See note 31 supra.
The greatest danger of insider speculation, however, may be the deterrent effect
insider trading has on the willingness of the general investing public to invest in any
security the price of which may not represent true value. Congressional recognition
of the deleterious effect on the investing public is illustrated by a committee report
stating that "investors' confidence in the exchange markets can be effected only by
a clearer recognition upon the part of the corporate managers of companies whose
securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as trustees for their corporations."
H.R. RP. No, 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
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perpetrated inequities on "innocent" insiders, that is, those who
have acted in complete good faith.6 A cursory examination of the
operation of section 16 (b) will illustrate its arbitrary nature which
may discourage the corporate officers from taking action against a
fellow insider. For example, an insider who holds his security for
six months or more before selling is not subject to liability7 under
section 16(b), notwithstanding proof that he has taken advantage of
inside information to realize profits on the transactions. 8 Similarly,
the insider will not incur 16 (b) liability-and the issuer will not be
able to recover the profits realized-on transactions initiated by
relatives or friends9 who utilize confidential information disclosed
by the insider.10 The provision also does not permit recovery from
a "guilty" insider in cases involving only purchases or sales within
the statutory holding period."
6 The subject of the inequities perpertrated by § 16 (b) and possible alternative ap-
proaches to the problem of insider trading has been treated extensively by the com-
mentators. See, e.g., Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An
Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q.
69 (1966); Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 Micir. L. REv. 649 (1964).
7Whether a holding period limited to six months imposes a substantial hardship or
curb on insiders is questionable, particularly since the tax laws already encourage
a holding period of six months in order to obtain long-term capital gains treatment.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1222 (3), 1201 (b); see Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845
(2d Cir. 1959). Nonetheless, since congressional hearings revealed that abuses of inside
information generally occurred within a short term, the six months time limit was
deemed adequate to eliminate most of the abuse and necessary to distinguish between
"legitimate" long-term investment and "illegitimate" short-swing speculation. S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); see Hardee, Stock Options and the "Insider
Trading" Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, 65 HAv. L. REv. 997, 1007
(1952); Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 511 (1950).
8 "One can speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the
passage of 24 hours but the statute makes an honest if not honorable man out of the
insider in that period." Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
9 Transactions by officials of different corporations, with whom the insider may
have an informal reciprocal agreement to exchange inside information about each
other's corporations, are not subject to the provision. 2 Loss 1043.
20 Early drafts of § 16 (b) provided that disclosure of inside information by insiders
was unlawful and that the issuer could recover the profits realized by one to whom
inside information had been divulged unless the insider's confidant had no reasonable
ground to believe that disclosure was improper. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15b (1934). These provisions were deleted from the final
draft "presumably because the burden of proof made enforcement unfeasible." Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
1 Liability for single transactions may, however, arise under the common law
duty of disclosure, see articles cited note 3 supra, or the prohibition of provisions of
the securities acts other than § 16 (b) of the Exchange Act, see Munter, supra note 6,
at 72.
Professor Loss apparently feels that an insider could be liable under Rule lOb-5
to one from whom he has purchased stock without revealing material information
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Section 16 (b) often imposes liability on the "innocent" insider
who has not abused his position since the actual unfair use of con-
fidential information by insiders or the intent to profit by its use
is irrelevant to the question of liability under section 16 (b).22  In
addition, the courts, perhaps disenchanted with the limitations on
the operation of section 16 (b), have given expansive interpretations
to its provisions. As a result of this judicial reaction it is possible
to envision imposition of 16 (b) liability and the recovery of profits
from an insider in the following circumstances: first, neither has he
taken advantage of confidential information nor has he been in a
position to utilize such information; 13 second, he has in fact suffered
and to the corporation under § 16 (b). 3 Loss 1473-74. For arguments supporting
double recovery see Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy
for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALP L.J. 1120, 1140-42 (1950).
22 See, e.g., Petteys v. Elau, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). Thus, the insider may not defend his short-swing trading by submitting
evidence of the details of the transactions to show that he did not possess any inside
information. Justification for the objective nature of the operation of § 16 (b) was
offered by one of its draftsmen as follows: "You hold the director, irrespective of any
intention or expectations to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you
have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of
having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a
short swing." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas G.
Corcoran).
23 Although § 16 (b) applies to every transaction that might afford an opportunity
for insider abuse, there is some doubt as to the applicability of the section to a factual
situation in which unfair speculation is impossible. The section was originally inter-
preted in the Second Circuit to apply to all stock conversions followed or preceded by
a sale or purchase within six months of the conversion. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). This per se approach has since
been rejected by the same circuit: "[I]n deciding whether a certain transaction is a
Section 16 (b) 'purchase' or 'sale' it is relevant to first consider whether the transaction
in any way makes possible the unfair insider trading that Section 16 (b) was designed
to prevent." Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has concluded that "[s]ection
16 (b) does set up a 'rule of thumb' and was intended by Congress to do precisely that."
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 1965). However, as noted in
a recent Eighth Circuit opinion, the objective approach to § 16 (b) problems adopted
by Heli-Coil "is founded almost solely upon the rationale of Park & Tilford. Since
Park & Tilford has now been severely limited by the later Second Circuit decisions
on this issue, we cannot refrain from the belief that Hell-Coil is likewise weakened."
Petteys v. Blau, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
The objective approach in this area is further shaken by the conclusion of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission that the conversion of equity securities is not even
comprehended within the purposes of § 16 (b). Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7826 (Feb. 17, 1966), amending Rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1967). Today
the evolving subjective standard is gaining acceptance at a rapid pace, but not
without dissent from some of the commentators. See, e.g., Kramer, An Examination
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an overall economic loss on the group of transactions comprising the
16 (b) violation; 14 third, he has had little reason to suspect that the
transactions would fall within the scope of the purchase and sale
requirement; 15 and finally, he has been encouraged to enter into
the transaction by the issuer, and, in fact, it has benefited from his
insider trading.10
of Section 16(b), 21 Bus. LAWYER 183, 186 (1965): "My thesis for today is that recent
decisions under Section 16 (b) have tended to move away radically, and I think wrongly,
from the certainty which appears to have been intended in the drafting of the
statute ....
", In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943), the Second Circuit laid down the method for computing the profits realized:
"The statute is broadly remedial .... We must suppose that the statute was intended
to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus
to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest
of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his
duty .. . . The only rule where all possible profits can be surely recovered is that of
lowest price in, highest price out-within six months .... " Id. at 239. Thus, profit
is calculated by first subtracting the lowest purchase price from the highest sale
price of an equal number of shares within the six months period. Then the next
lowest purchase price is subtracted from the next highest sale, and the process is
repeated until all of the shares purchased during the period for which recovery of
profits is sought have been subtracted from shares sold for higher prices during the
same period. See Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corpo.
-rate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 482-83 (1947). Since losses suffered
may not be offset against profits, in a particular case the insider may be liable for
"profits" in an amount greater than his actual gain. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) ($300,000 judgment rendered
against ten percent shareholder whose trading had resulted in an actual loss of over
$400,000). In fact, the issuer may recover "profits" from an insider who has suffered a
loss on each transaction during the six-month period. See Munter, supra note 6, at
82.
No definition of "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" can be found in
§ 16 (b). Another provision of the Act defines "purchase" simply as "any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act § 3 (a) (13), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 (c) (a) (13) (1964).
Ignorance or misunderstanding by insiders of § 16 (b) will not, of course, provide
them with a defense before the courts. Munter, supra note 6, at 89. However, the
corporation's decision whether to seek to recover the profits may be affected by the
insider's good faith belief that the section would not apply to his situation.
26 Insider trading may benefit the corporation in several respects. A recent report
by the New York Stock Exchange has disclosed that stockholders want their officers and
directors to have a substantial amount of their own capital invested in the enterprise.
NEw YoRK STocK EXCHANGE, THE CORPORATE DIRELOR AND THE INVES INo PUBLIC
(1965), cited in Munter, supra note 6, at 88 n.82. Indeed, management may initiate
employee stock purchase or stock option plans to provide additional incentives for
insiders to improve their performance. The recent SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), decision recognized that nothing in the Act "pre.
cludes insiders from purchasing stock of their company or from being beneficiaries of
the company's incentive stock option plan. On the contrary, it is important under our
free enterprise system that insiders, including directors, officers, and employees, be
encouraged to own securities of their company. The incentive that comes with stock
ownership benefits both the company and its shareholders." Id. at 280. Of course,
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CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING INITIATION OF AN ISSUER'S
SECTION 16(b) SUIT
Tactical Matters
Certainty of Liability. When the possibility that an insider has
incurred liability under section 16 (b) is brought to the attention of
a corporation, three alternative avenues will be open to management:
(a) do nothing;
(b) attempt to induce the insider voluntarily to surrender the
profits to the issuer or to compromise with the issuer; or
(c) bring suit against the insider to recover the profits.
Frequently the procedure to be followed will be influenced by the
certainty of liability. For example, in situations where insider
liability is clear, a substantial likelihood exists that the directors will
incur personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty if they fail
to settle the claim or institute suit. Further, if the insider is
definitely answerable under section 16 (b), a shareholder of the
corporation will likely institute suit in the absence of an initiation
of litigation by management.17 . On the other hand, if liability is
unsettled the corporation will probably have no legal duty to initiate
an action, and its failure to respond will not sustain a charge of
fiduciary breach.18
§ 16 (b) does not preclude insider ownership, but only discourages both a purchase
and sale within a relatively short period of time.
The argument also has been made that insider trading benefits the corporation in
retarding undue declines and rises in the market. Munter, supra note 6, at 88.
However, there are persuasive arguments that, even assuming insiders will trade against
the market, no stabilizing effect results from such trading, see Rubin & Feldman, supra
note 14, at 501-02, and that even if market trends are modified, violation of the in-
sider's fiduciary duty is not justified, see 2 Loss 1088-89. In any case, it is well estab-
lished that the corporation, which is often merely the unwilling instrument for en-
forcement of the statutory policy, will not be estopped from suing the insider. See, e.g.,
Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956) (stock was sold at the issuer's suggestion and with the approval of a majority
of shareholders); Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (sole
shareholder of the corporation agreed to finance defendant's purchase); Perlman v.
Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (corporation approved the transaction);
Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (insider desired to benefit the corpo-
ration); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La. 1952), aff'd,
202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (stock acquired pursuant to
a stock option plan). Contra, Consolidated Eng'r Corp. v. Nesbit, 102 F. Supp. 112
(S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 468
(9th Cir. 1953).
17 See note 4 supra and note 81 infra; cf. Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857,
861 (1962).
18 See notes 54-61 infra and accompanying text; cf. Truncale v. Universal Pictures
Co., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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In the corporation's determination of whether to undertake
suit, the size of the possible recovery should be considered along
with the relative certainty of liability. If a large sum is involved,
it is more probable that a security holder will bring the action if
the corporation fails to act even though liability is less than certain.
On the other hand, where liability is certain but only for a small
amount, it would appear that the insider would repay voluntarily
the profits to the issuer to avoid the expense and adverse publicity
of litigation.19 Upon the failure of corporate officials to press a
claim for recovery of a small sum, the likelihood is diminished that
the security holder and his attorney will view recovery of an in-
substantial sum sufficient inducement to institute an action on behalf
of the corporation.
Extrajudicial settlement may, of course, be a desirable alternative
to actual litigation by the corporation: not only is adverse publicity
avoided, but in addition overall expenditures of time and assets may
be reduced.20 However, compromises between an insider and the
19 It is doubtful in many states whether the corporation will be able to indemnify
the insider for his litigation expense. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp.
1966).
2 0 The favorable tax treatment afforded any sum surrendered voluntarily may en-
courage the insider to settle the claim without suit by either the corporation or a share-
holder. A 1951 Tax Court decision refused to permit an insider to deduct the
§ 16 (b) "profit" he had disgorged to the corporation. William F. Davis, 17 T.C. 549
(1951). The court viewed the sanction imposed by § 16 (b) in the nature of a penalty
and reasoned that allowance of a deduction as a business expense or loss would
frustrate the policy expressed in the statute. Id. at 556. However, in a later case in
which the insider "voluntarily" paid his "profits" to the corporation, without admitting
liability, in order to avoid the expenses of litigation and preserve his business reputa-
tion, the court allowed the deduction. Laurence W. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956). The
court reasoned, first, that the payment was an ordinary and necessary business expense
and, second, that allowance of such a deduction where actual liability was highly
uncertain would not frustrate "sharply defined public policy" or tend to encourage
further violations. Id. at 468.
This decision was followed by Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46, which, in
overruling I.T. 4069, 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 28, stated that: "The purpose of the statute is
to place the insider in the same position he would have occupied if he had never
engaged in the stock dealings. This purpose is not frustrated by the allowance of a
tax deduction for amounts paid by reason of section 16(b); but, rather, the allowance
of the deduction is consistent with the purpose of the statute in returning the insider
to his original position .... The income tax significance of the capital stock dealings
giving rise to the payment determines whether it is deductible as an ordinary loss or
a capital loss." 1961-1 CuM. BuLL, at 48.
The rationale of the Marks case would not seem to support the conclusion that
deductions as business expenses will be allowed for "amounts paid by reason of
section 16 (b)" in all cases. Thus, where payment, although "voluntary," is for the
purpose of avoiding liability or payment follows judicial determination of liability
the requisite business purpose would be absent. For example, in a recent Tax Court
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issuer must be consummated at arm's length.21 Although the insider
receives credit for the amount paid, the settlement is no defense to
later action by a security holder against the trader.22 Moreover, any
settlement of a 16 (b) case reached after a security holder has either
initiated or intervened in actual litigation will be subject to the
provisions of Rule 23 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
regulating the procedure for settling class actions.23
Position of the Insider in the Corporate Structure. If the in-
sider is sufficiently influential in the corporate hierarchy, the decision
of whether to litigate a recovery will not, of course, be totally objec-
tive. Since the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act have
extended application of section 16 (b) to some corporations whose
securities are traded over the counter,24 more close corporations,25
having one or a few controlling shareholders (who generally will
also be directors), fall under the coverage of section 16(b). Such
corporations provide a prolific source of inadvertent insider short-
swing trading, for often they do not have house counsel and their
officials are unfamiliar with the provisions of section 16 (b) and
especially with the broad definitions of "purchase," "sale," and
"profits."2 l
case the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's payment to the corporation was
motivated by a desire to escape criminal prosecution for violation of the Securities Act
and therefore should be a nondeductible personal expense. Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C.
787 (1965). The court, however, accepted the taxpayer's testimony that payment in
satisfaction of a claim of uncertain validity was to preserve his professional reputation,
and cited the Marks case in permitting the deduction under § 162 (a) of the Code as
a business expense. Id. at 799. Moreover, insiders' attempts to deduct payments as
business losses after judicial determination of liability may run afoul of the public
policy rationale of the earlier decisions. Allowance of deductions where liability
is established may encourage future violations of the section and thus frustrate public
policy.
21 See Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); accord, Pappas
v. Moss, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,694 (D.N.J. 1966).
12 Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
21 A corporation on its own motion has been permitted to intervene as a plaintiff to
insure vigorous prosecution of a 16 (b) action where it has reason to fear that the
security holder who instituted suit was not diligently pressing the claim. Silverman v.
Re, 194 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In one instance a district court granted a
corporation's motion to be made a party plaintiff in order to guard against the dilu-
tion of any recovery through the intervention of other shareholders. Gratz v.
Claughton, Civil No. 35-410 (S.D.N.Y.), cited in Silverman v. Re, supra at 542 nA.
21 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (g), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (g) (1964).
2r"Close" is used in this context to indicate that although ownership of shares
may not be limited to only a few persons, control of the corporation is firmly vested
in the hands of one dominant shareholder or a small group of prominent shareholders.
See generally 1 F. O'NE.L, CLOSE COrPORATIONS §§ 1.02-.04 (1958).
20 See note 15 supra.
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The insider who is influential within the corporate structure will
probably attract greater empathy and elicit more support than one
occupying a subordinate managerial position. This emotional
factor is usually cloaked by businessmen in the traditional assertion
that intracorporate harmony will be jeopardized if management fails
to support one of its own number.27  However, the weight to be
afforded intracorporate harmony would appear to vary inversely
with the lack of good faith on the part of the insider. Similarly, the
issuer will be much more likely to take affirmative action against the
insider if he is not closely related to present management.28 For
example, the insider may be an officer or director who no longer is
connected with the corporation, having assumed a new position
with a competitor or having been discharged;2 9 or he may be a
dissident shareholder who is part of a "take over" attempt.8 0 In these
situations the pressing of a 16 (b) claim may provide management an
opportunity to subject its opponents to financial disability or to
discredit them in some other manner.
Shareholder's Attorney's Fees Reducing the Corporate Recovery.
The primary right to institute an action to recover short-swing profits
resides in the corporation. However, since the issuer may fail to
act diligently to discover the violation, institute suit, or pursue the
cause of action against one of its own officers, directors, or influential
stockholders, section 16 (b) also provides that any security holder
of the issuer may bring action on its behalf.8 ' The recovery of
27 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Varian Associates v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd, 334
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
29 See, e.g., Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
80 See, e.g., Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423, 427 (M.D. Pa.
1954) (defendant alleged that the action was a reprisal measure after he had unsuccess-
fully attempted to oust management).
81The security holder may institute the action if the corporation fails or refuses
to bring suit within sixty days after a request is made or fails to prosecute diligently
any action taken. To permit commencement of suits prior to the end of the sixty
day period "not only deprives the corporation of its right to conduct the litigation
but also disregards the clear and unequivocal language of the statute." Henss v.
Schneider, 132 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Moreover, to permit such suits "would
subject a corporation to harassment by a multiplicity of suits by its security holders,
all of whom would be equally entitled to assert the corporate right." Id. at 63.
The sixty-day waiting period may be waived if any demand that the corporation
institute suit would be futile. Thus, no demand was necessary where the individual
whose profits were sought to be recovered had effective control over the corporation,
Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); accord, Miller v. General
Outdoor Advertising Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Weisman
v. Spector, 158 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Netter v. Ashland Paper Mills, Inc., 19
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attorneys' fees is one of several judicial developments relating to
16 (b) suits which compounds the general negative reaction to such
suits by a corporation which has decided not to prosecute the claim.
Although the section contains no authorization for compensation or
reimbursement of costs to security holders instituting actions, the
courts have liberally awarded counsel fees. They have reasoned
that reimbursement is required by equitable considerations32 and
that such fees often provide the "sole stimulus" for vigorous en-
forcement of the statute.33 As a result of the granting of substantial
allowances, usually in the form of a percentage of the total recovery
from the insider,3 4 the issuer may conclude that the action has been
F.R.D. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); where the insider had close business and family relation-
ships with the board of directors which had not acted although probably having
knowledge of the transactions, Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
or where the issuer in a proxy statement had advised its stockholders that it did not
propose to bring suit, Berkwich v. Mencher, 239 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Simi-
larly, if a delay of sixty days before bringing suit would result in the statute of
limitations barring recovery, the full statutory period need not be observed. See, e.g.,
Grossman v. Young, supra at 580; Henss v. Schneider, supa (dictum).
Rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for intervention
whenever representation of the applicant's interest may be inadequate. The courts
have been liberal in permitting intervention by security holders to insure that corporate
rights would be fully protected whenever it appeared that corporations, in prosecuting
suits or appeals, were not acting with diligence. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203
F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7
F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
12 Shareholders have been reimbursed for their counsel fees, out of the fund re-
covered by the corporation, by analogy to the rule in stockholders' or creditors' deriva-
tive actions. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943). Thus, the corporation which has received the benefit of the attorneys'
services, in an action which it had been unwilling to institute, should pay for the
reasonable value of those services. Id.
83The Securities and Exchange Commission is given no direct power to enforce
§ 16 (b), and thus proceedings can be initiated only by the issuer or one of its security
holders. The corporation may be unwilling to sue one of its officers, directors or in-
fluential shareholders, and the incentive for shareholder action will not be great, as
his pro rata recovery, realized by the increase in the corporation's assets, generally
will be quite small. Although in certain circumstances a shareholder may be moti-
vated to bring suit as the basis of an attempt to oust management, see Yourd, supra
note 3, at 152, or a corporation may act as a reprisal measure against an insider, see
Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423, 427 (M.D. Pa. 1954), gen-
erally "the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the sole stimulus for
the enforcement of 16 (b), [and] the allowance must not be too niggardly." Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
11 See 2 Loss 1052, and cases cited therein; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 385, 421 & nn.142-43. The amount de-
pends upon the size of the fund recovered, Kors v. United Whelan Corp., CCH FED.
SEC. L. RaP. 90,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); the time consumed and the difficulty of the
litigation, Lewis v. Rosenberg, CCH FED. SEc. L. RaEP. 90,856 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); and
the contribution made by the attorney, Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984
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commenced not for the benefit of the issuer or its shareholders, but
primarily to gain a fee for the security holder's attorney. Neverthe-
less, the courts have refused to consider charges of champerty,1 or
any other allegations relating to the plaintiff's motive for suing, 0 as
a defense to a claim for an award of attorney's fees.87 Moreover,
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F.
Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y.), aff/d, 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956). If a shareholder is permitted to intervene in an action brought by the corpo-
ration and does not contribute to the proceedings, compensation will not be awarded.
Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Wigmore, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 90,376 (S.D.N.Y.
1947). Moreover, the shareholder will not be compensated for "watchdog" services
designed to insure against improvident settlements after the corporation has instituted
suit. Gilson v. Chock Full o'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
3 In Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), the de-
fendant alleged that, on the basis of the infinitesimal interest of the shareholder in
the outcome of the suit (if successful his equity interest in the corporation would
have been increased by $1.10), the proceedings must have been financed by the attorney
for the sole purpose of earning a fee. The court recognized the possible existence of
a champertous agreement but held that the claims were irrelevant. "Presumably Con-
gress is aware of the opportunity presented to attorneys to finance suits for their
benefit, but apparently it regards public policy against proved and repeated violations
of fiduciary responsibility by corporate officers at the expense of the public more detri-
mental to public good than the violation of generally accepted ethics by attorneys.
The personal feelings of the court on the subject aside, its duty is to aid in the
enforcement of the statute .... ." Id. at 783. The Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court, stating that "the public policy of New York cannot nullify this federally
created right .... " Magida v. Continenal Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
8o See, e.g., Blau v. Ogsbury, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 90,635 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), affd
on other grounds, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (motive immaterial even though shares
purchased after the transaction of which plaintiff complains); Magida v. Continental
Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (denial of motion to compel plaintiff to answer
questions relating to motive. But cf. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 400, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied in part because
circumstances under which he acquired his shares might call for application of the
doctrine of "unclean hands').
37The champerty problem created by the present mode of enforcement has
troubled courts and commentators. The Second Circuit has affirmed the position taken
by a lower court that although the statute may promote the "violation of generally
accepted ethics by attorneys.... [i]t is for the Congress, if it sees fit, to curb the evil side
effects of the statute by imposing appropriate restrictions." Magida v. Continental Can
Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 972 (1956). Professor Loss has suggested that the section be amended to provide
for enforcement by the SEC rather than the issuer and its security holders. 2 Loss
1053. Professor Cary, then chairman of the Commission, disagreed with this view on
the grounds that the present system has been effective, that self-executing controls
without governmental intervention should be preferred to proceedings by a regulatory
agency in behalf of private parties, and that the Commission does not have the man-
power or financial resources to supervise and investigate so much private litigation.
See Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 COLum. L. REv. 856 (1963);
Cary, Book Review, 75 HAgv. L. REv. 857 (1962).
The argument that the government's role in private litigation should be minimized
is countered by the assertion that such litigation is for a public purpose and, therefore,
the public should be able to enforce its own interest. Munter, supra note 6, at 96-99.
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Rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
that a plaintiff suing in a derivative capacity must have been a share-
holder at the time of the transaction complained of or have received
his shares by operation of law, has been found inapplicable to
actions under section 16 (b).38
Although the corporation will not be liable for the attorney's fees
incurred by a shareholder when there is no corporate recovery, 9 any
recovery resulting from enforcement by the corporation of a 16 (b)
claim in response to the shareholder's demand may be reduced by
the shareholder's attorney's fees. The courts have reasoned that
effective enforcement of the statute requires the award of fees
whether or not the shareholder is a party of record to the action. 40
Professor Loss has proposed that a percentage of any recovery arising out of action
by the Commission should be awarded by the courts to the Federal Treasury. 2 Loss
1053-54. Although such allowances would be considerably less than the present allow-
ances for plaintiffs' attorneys, this system of enforcement still retains the advantage of
encouraging the corporation to act itself in order to avoid having its recovery di-
minished. Id.
"s 2 Loss 1046. The courts have relied on the language and policy of § 16(b) to
reach this conclusion. Dottenheim. v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 919 (1955); Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953). The statute
states that suit may be brought by the owner of any security of the issuer without
qualification. Moreover, "Congress did not intend procedural restrictions to hamper
[a statutory policy intended to ultimately benefit the general public]. ... Benisch
v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In the Murchison case the Fifth
Circuit also indicated that the statute creates an entirely new cause of action and thus
the shareholder's suit is not a derivative action which would be subject to the pro-
cedural requirements of Rule 23 (b). Dottenheim v. Murchison, supra at 738-39.
11 Henss v. Schneider, 132 F. Supp. 60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Since the corporation's
liability for fees is limited to payments out of the sum recovered, shareholder's counsel
may also find that they have worked for little if the corporate recovery is small. See,
e.g, Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
'
0fDottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); Angoff v.
Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 190 (1st Cir. 1959) (dictum); Henss v. Schneider, 132 F. Supp.
60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum). In sustaining the shareholder's complaint in Dotten-
heim, the court observed that to permit reimbursement only when an action had been
brought and the expenses of legal proceedings had been incurred "would be penal-
izing efficiency and expediency." Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., supra at
197.
Attorney's fees were subsequently awarded in Dottenheim even though the in-
formation contained in the demand letter was already known to the directors of the
corporation. Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
However, the approach of the court in determining the size of the fee may indicate a
reluctance to grant allowances in such cases. The figure was reached in the follow-
ing manner: since the corporation was aware of all the facts set forth in the demand
letter, the letter merely "acted as a spur" to the corporation to demand payment
from the insider. Id. at 307. After receiving this letter on December 17, 1945, the
corporation requested and received from the insider on February 15, 1946, without
any action being commenced, the sum of $57,872. However, the statute of limitations
would have given the corporation two years from the date on which the profit was
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The primary cases involving a claim for payment of fees although
the shareholder never instituted suit have, however, limited the cir-
cumstances under which such awards will be made.
In Gilson v. Chock Full o' Nuts Corporation,41 the Second Circuit
granted recovery of attorney's fees even though the shareholder was
not a party of record to the action on the ground that his attorney
had rendered substantial legal services beyond the mere preparation
of the statutory request to sue.42 The court noted that the corpora-
tion, in response to the attorney's letter, advised the attorney that
preliminary investigation had not revealed any violations of section
16 (b) by the accused insiders. The attorney, confronted with this
negative attitude and the imminent running of the statute of limita-
tions, then began to prepare a complaint which he planned to file
shortly after expiration of the sixty-day period. On the sixtieth day,
two days before the running of the statute, the shareholder's counsel
was notified by the corporation that it had commenced an action that
day against the insiders. Thus, since the attorney did more than
merely find a claim and bring it to the corporation's attention, the
court did not have to determine if counsel fees would have been
recoverable for these limited services. While expressly refusing to
decide this question, the court strongly intimated that compensation
for finding a 16 (b) claim would be refused in the absence of the
performance of additional and substantial professional services which
might be justified by a negative response to the demand and the
imminent running of the statute of limitations.48
realized, December 18, 1944, to institute the action. "Hence at most the contribution
of the plaintiff was to enable the corporation without suit to have the use of
$57,872 from February 15, 1946, until December 18, 1946, a matter of ten months,
Assuming that the corporation could have invested that sum at 4%, [it] . . . would
have earned interest amounting to $1,929.05." Id. at 307-08.
1331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
42 The district court had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on
the grounds that there was no allegation of an express contract of hire between
the attorney and the corporation and that legal fees should not be awarded on the
basis of "[t]he mere sending of a letter and the investigation preliminary to it . .. ."
Gilson v. Chock Full o'Nuts Corp., 224 F. Supp. 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). A three
judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court,
basing its decision on "[t]he principle of the Dottenheim case, [which], so far as we are
informed, has never been questioned." 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964). See note 40
supra. In a rehearing en banc, the Second Circuit affirmed its reversal of the lower
court. 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
I' The court cited two cases, neither involving § 16 (b), in which shareholders had
been denied reimbursement for bringing to the corporation's attention a claim that
it successfully prosecuted. 331 F.2d at 109; see Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315
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A New York district court, in Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Incorpo-
rated,4 met directly the issue of the effect of the Gilson dictum on
recovery of fees for an investigation by a shareholder's attorney which
yielded no more than a revelation of the existence of a potential
16(b) claim. While recognizing that extensive investigation had
preceded preparation of the claim letter, the court concluded that
the research had "no legal force . . .since it related only to plain-
tiffs' efforts to bring to the attention of the corporation the transac-
tions complained of."'45 Though plaintiff in this case had drafted a
complaint, the court found this service to be prematurely rendered
since, unlike in Gilson, the corporation expressed no reluctance
to pursue the claim and the statute of limitations was not in danger
of expiring.
If these opinions are accepted as sufficiently precedential, an
affirmative response by the corporation to the shareholder's 16 (b)
request is desirable. Presumably, either settlement or initiation of
litigation is acceptable. Thus, despite the liberal judicial tendencies
in rewarding the shareholder's attorney out of a corporate recovery,
appropriate managerial action can avoid the detriment attendant this
procedure.
The practical effect of the Gilson and Rayette decisions may be
to thwart prompt enforcement of section 16 (b). The shareholder's
attorney may not bring the claim to the attention of the issuer at the
time the information is discovered. Rather, in order to increase the
likelihood of recovery for filing a claim, he will delay his demand
until after it becomes apparent that the corporation is not going to
institute the action. Similarly, the attorney may withhold the de-
mand until the two-year statute of limitations is about to run, thus
reducing the sixty-day period permitted for corporate action. The
corporation also may be encouraged to sit on the claim since it
Pa. 335, 172 A. 678 (1934); Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 227 N.Y.S.2d
64 (App. Div.), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 814, 187 N.E.2d 131, 236 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1962). The
Second Circuit added that: "Acts of this sort seem rather analogous to those of the
informer, which, like those of other volunteers, are not usually compensable in the
absence of statute .... There are policy considerations against requiring a corpora-
tion to pay a stockholder for volunteering to do what the corporation ought to do and
might well have done without any impulse from him, considerations that would be
especially strong in a case where the stockholder's request was made shortly after
the information became available from reports under § 16 (a) and at a time when the
corporation still had many months in which to sue." 331 F.2d at 109.
"1270 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
,[Id. at 887.
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probably will not be liable for any attorney's expenses until after
demand has been made.
Legal Consideration: Liability of Corporate Officials for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty.
Although there has not been extensive litigation on the ques-
tion,46 possible breach of fiduciary duty implications exist in con-
nection with corporate executives' failure to take proper action when
a probable 16 (b) violation comes to their attention.47 The legal
basis for dereliction of duty charges in this context is that Congress
has vested the corporation with a statutorily-created cause of action
which constitutes a corporate asset,48 and pursuing a course of action
or inaction which intentionally or negligently causes the corpora-
tion to "waste" or diminish that asset constitutes a violation of the
duty of fiduciary obligation which an officer or director owes to the
,Apparently, only one §16(b) case, Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 76 F.
Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), specifically dealing with breach of fiduciary duty has been
litigated. In the Truncale case the complaint alleged that the issuer's directors
had violated their fiduciary obligations to the corporation by failing to act upon
their knowledge that an officer had realized short-swing trading profits. More par-
ticularly, the directors were charged with conspiring to allow the two-year statute
of limitations under § 16(b) to run, thus permitting waste of a corporate asset.
Damages asked were in the amount of the officer's profits, for that was the value
of the corporate asset allegedly wasted. The court held that the "stockholder's
claim under § 16 (b) is not, strictly speaking, derivative at all, but one possessing in-
dependent statutory origin." Id. at 470. Since the shareholder had an independent
claim against the profiting officer, the court reasoned, New York law required a
showing that the directors had by means of fraud or negligent misrepresentation con-
tributed "to [the] inaction of the stockholders in the enforcement of their statutory
cause of action .. " Id. Since allegations of such conduct by the directors were not
made, the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. The court intimated that
a different result would follow "[i]f the complaint alleged that the defendants had
been guilty of deceit in inducing stockholders to stay their hand, or had practiced
a fraud upon the stockholders which lulled them into inaction, or, perhaps, had
negligently made representations the proximate consequence of which was stock-
holder inaction ...... Id. at 470-71.
4 7Corporate counsel have apparently assumed that corporate officials have no
affirmative duty to prevent § 16 (b) transactions or to discover them once they have
occurred. An argument can be made, however, that the strong public policy in
favor of enforcing the statutory provision and the peculiar need of assistance from
corporate officials to accomplish this policy impose a duty upon directors to seek out
§ 16 (b) transactions. In terms of corporation law such a duty would be grounded on
the doctrine that directors must exercise ordinary and reasonable supervision in con-
ducting the affairs of the issuer. See Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 111. App.
179, 50 N.E2d 602 (1943); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d
125 (1963) (dictum).
48 Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); cf. United
Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Koral v. Savory, Inc.,
276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E.2d 883 (1937).
[Vol. 1968: 94
INSIDER TRADING
corporation.49 Although the right of the corporation to recover the
short-swing profits is created by section 16 (b), local law determines
whether corporate officials have breached their fiduciary duty to
the issuer by preventing realization, or full realization, of the value
of its claim.50 An action for damages is unlike other corporate
assets,9 ' however, and a 16 (b) claim differs greatly from other causes
of action that a corporation may have.52 By enacting the statute in
the form it did, Congress established a unique private enforcement
system to enforce a public law. Although the recovery of the short-
swing profits inures to the benefit of the corporation, the exaction
from the wrongdoing insider is not primarily for the protection of
the issuer but for that of the investing public.9 3  Thus, the policy
of the law necessarily must strongly favor the bringing of 16 (b)
actions and oppose anything which impedes operation of the legis-
latively established enforcement system. What effect this considera-
tion has on the standard that corporate officials must meet when
investigating and prosecuting an alleged section 16 (b) violation-
and, more generally, to what extent the established common law
governing corporate offlicals' fiduciary duty in other contexts is
applicable in connection with section 16 (b)-is not yet clear. Courts
recognize the uniqueness of a derivative action under section 16 (b),
but they have not clearly established what standard will be applied
to determine if corporate officials have violated their fiduciary obliga-
tion to the issuer.
When a possible insider short-swing transaction comes to the
attention of the directors of the issuer, they will be called upon to
make a business decision as to the course of action which the corpo-
o See Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921); cf. Isaac v.
Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 179 N.E. 487 (1932); Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co.,
370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952).
ro Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 76 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
51 "Wasting" a cause of action is more easily justified than is destroying tangible
corporate property, for the directors can frequently rely on business justifications
which militate against pursuing the cause of action in the public sphere.
52 Normally when a corporation has a cause of action, the law is primarily concerned
with restoring to the corporation what it rightly deserves. This is not so with § 16 (b),
however, for its foremost purpose is to make the use of inside information unprofitable
and the fact that the corporation is given a claim against the insider is only ancillary
to accomplishment of the primary purpose. See note 3 supra and accompanying
text.
,; See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 965 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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ration will pursue. A rule of law, often referred to as the Business
Judgment Rule, exists in most states whereby courts refuse to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of a corporation as long as the directors are
exercising their honest business judgment in making management
decisions." Application of this Rule extends to decisions by directors
concerning corporate causes of action 55 Generally what action a
corporation shall take on a claim it may have is properly reserved
to the discretion of its directors in the absence of instruction by vote
from the shareholders. 56 Courts normally will not interfere with
the exercise of such discretion57 or permit a shareholder to question
the considered decision of the directors by maintaining a derivative
suit to enforce a right that belongs to the corporation.5 8 That privi-
lege is vested solely in the corporation, acting through its directors, 0
and mere failure on the part of the board to commence action does
not entitle a shareholder to sue derivatively to compel realization
of the corporate claim. 0 In short, "a corporation's right not to sue
is correlative to its right to sue." 61
At common law and under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure a shareholder bringing such an action must allege
",See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); Taylor v. Axton-
Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226, 173 S.W.2d 377 (1943); Blaustein v. Pan Am.
Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
5See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917); System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 175 Neb. 387, 122 N.W.2d 1 (1963).
" See, e.g., Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 217, 11 N.E.2d 883, 884-85 (1937).
57See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264
(1917); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 217, 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1937).
58 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 764, 144 P.2d 725, 731 (1944).
59See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957); Goodwin v.
Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 764-65, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944).
00 See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957).
61 Id. "As a general proposition, it is not doubted that directors or stockholders, as
a matter of business policy, may refuse to bring a suit." S. Solomont & Sons Trust,
Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 113, 93 N.E.2d 241, 248
(1950). In this same case the court said that if an "independent, disinterested majority
of the stockholders acting reasonably and in good faith have voted that in their judg-
ment it is not in the best interest of the corporation .... " to institute suit, a share-
holder's derivative action to enforce the claim on behalf of the corporation would
be dismissed. Id. at 114, 93 N.E.2d at 249.
Application of these statements in the context of actions for insider short-swing
trading is doubtful; for a refusal by the directors, acting in good faith, to pursue a
§ 16(b) claim will not preclude a shareholder derivative action against the insider
to prosecute the cause of action, see, e.g., Berkwich v. Mencher, 239 F. Supp. 792
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), and even approval of or encouragement to enter into the § 16 (b) trans-
action by the corporation will not bar such a derivative suit, see, e.g., Perfect Photo,
Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (El). Pa. 1962); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp.
246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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that he has unsuccessfully exhausted his intracorporate remedies or
explain why demand upon corporate officials to prosecute the claim
would be futile. 2 Failure to do so will preclude maintenance of his
suit on behalf of the corporation. 63 Furthermore, even if he fulfills
this requirement by alleging existence of facts entitling him to sue
derivatively, the propriety of the action or the necessity for its
continued maintenance does not automatically follow.64 "The right
of a stockholder of a corporation to bring suit to enforce, for the
benefit of the corporation, a cause of action, which belongs to the
corporation, is purely equitable." 65 Moreover, in order to overcome
the effect of the Business Judgment Rule, the shareholder, since he is
relying on principles of equity, must allege and prove facts consti-
tuting an equitable basis permitting his intervention 66-facts evi-
dencing fraud, bad faith, breach of trust, gross mismanagement, ultra
vires acts,0 7 or existence of a dual relation preventing an un-
prejudicial exercise of judgment6 8 on the part of the directors in
determining either not to pursue or to compromise the claim.
Thus in practice it would seem that the Business Judgment Rule
would act both to insulate the directors from liability for breach of
fiduciary duty and to preclude a shareholder from maintaining a
derivative action against the insider-trader if the directors have
compromised the claim or determined not to pursue it. Generally
courts will consider themselves lacking in sufficient expertise to
review the reasonableness of such business judgments made by
experienced corporate officials.6 9 However, one case, Pellegrino v.
02 See, e.g., Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Ref. Co., 285 U.S. 635, 639 (1915); DePinto v.
Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 950 (1964); Waller v. Waller, 187 Md. 185, 192, 49 A.2d 449, 453 (1946) (dictum).
03 See, e.g., Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Ref. Co., 235 U.S. 635 (1915); Swanson v. Traer,
249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957).
01 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 762-63, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944).0 Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 218, 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1937).
00 See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1958); Koral v. Savory,
Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 218, 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1937); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d
748, 763-64, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944) ("The lone stockholder or the stockholders bring-
ing such action not only have the burden of proving the material charges entitling the
corporation itself to recover, but they must also establish the grounds entitling them
to sue in place of the corporation.").
C7 See, e.g., Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 850-51 (Mo.
1961).
"8 See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264
(1917); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 218-19, 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1937); Isaac v.
Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932).
" See, e.g., Ingwersen Mfg. Co. v. Maddocks, 118 Colo. 281, 298-99, 195 P.2d 730,
789 (1948).
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Nesbit,70 has indicated that the strength of the rule may be diluted
in the context of section 16 (b). Implicitly acknowledging the
"general rule that a corporation's board of directors may, subject to
the exercise of good faith and a reasonable business judgment,
determine whether the best interests of the corporation and its stock-
holders would be served by engaging in litigation,"7' the court held
that section 16 (b) imposes "limitations" upon this usual discretion
vested in the directors and, more specifically, that a decision by them
not to appeal an adverse 16 (b) judgment does not preclude inter-
vention by a shareholder to perfect an appeal from such judgment, 2
even though the shareholder had not been a party to the original
action.73  It is arguable, however, that the court meant to weaken
the import of the Business Judgment Rule only when enforcement
of 16 (b) is at issue, for it emphasized that "[a]ny stockholder has a
right to institute suit if the corporation fails to do so, regardless of
the good faith or reasonable business judgment of the board of
directors."7 4  If this interpretation is correct, the permissible dis-
1- 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953).
71Mtd. at 466-67.
72Id. at 468-69.
73 Id. at 465.74 Id. at 467 (emphasis added). On superficial analysis § 16 (b) appears not to alter
the common law doctrine permitting a shareholder to maintain a derivative action
to enforce a corporate claim if the corporation's directors fail to prosecute its cause
of action. See text following note 61 supra. Seemingly, the statute merely sets forth
the shareholder's right in detail in the § 16 (b) setting and regulates it procedurally
by providing a notice requirement and waiting period-a built-in test to insure ex-
haustion of intracorporate remedies before resorting to the derivative action. Upon
further study, however, it seems clear that § 16(b) modified the substance of a share-
holder's right to question the directors' business decision not to pursue or to settle an
insider trading claim. Under § 16(b) only the procedural regulations prescribed by
the statute must be met, and the intervenor need not affirmatively establish an equi-
table basis for his intervention, as is necessary in the usual derivative action to
prosecute a corporate claim. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. Good faith
inaction or compromise for an amount less than the insider's profits may insulate
the directors from personal liability but will not necessarily preclude a shareholder
derivative action against the insider. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
It is this divergence from the general law governing derivative actions that
prompted the Smolowe court to observe that § 16 (b) "in effect creates a derivative
right of action in every stockholder," 186 F.2d at 241, and the Truncale court to
assert that a "stockholder's claim under § 16 (b) is not, strictly speaking, derivative at
all, but one possessing independent statutory origin." 76 F. Supp. at 470. See note 61
supra. Unfortunately, however, the court in Truncale did not consider what effect,
if any, this modification of the requirements to maintain an action on behalf of a
corporation to enforce a corporate claim has on the standard of fiduciary obligation
which officers and directors owe to the issuer. Unless public policy imposes a dual
fiduciary duty on corporate officials, they should be answerable in terms of personal
liability to the corporation and its shareholders only for failure to exercise im-
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cretion exercisable by the directors will be diminished when in-
vocation of the Rule to preclude shareholders from prosecuting the
claim would thwart the congressionally established enforcement
procedure of section 16 (b). For purposes of defending against a
derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, however, the
directors would still be permitted to rely on the fact that they acted
in good faith and exercised their reasonable judgment in refusing
to bring suit or in settling for a lesser amount than the alleged
profits under section 16 (b). This distinction seems justified, for it
is based on the assumption that the allegation of breach of fiduciary
duty concerns only a duty owed to the corporation and not one owed
to the public at large. Even though Congress has prescribed the
unique enforcement measures under section 16 (b), it has not at-
tempted an alteration of the standard of obligation owed to the
issuer; and the shareholder's derivative action, alleging breach of
duty, relates only to the relationship between the corporate principal
and its officers and directors.
This distinction and the different purposes for which the Rule
is being used can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that
an alleged 16 (b) violation in which liability is clear is compromised
by the board for an amount considerably less than the profit realized
by the insider. Positing that the negotiations were at arm's length
and that the directors acted in good faith and out of concern for
such factors as injurious publicity and litigation expenses off-setting
the financial gain from disgorgement, the Business Judgment Rule
should protect them against charges of breach of fiduciary duty.
However, consistent with the Pellegrino language that "limitations"
upon the discretion normally vested in the directors exist in the
context of section 16 (b), 5 the settlement would not necessarily bar
a shareholder derivative action against the insider for recovery of
the difference between his profits under section 16(b) and the negoti-
ated amount of settlement.7 6 In permitting such an action, the
partially and in good faith their reasonable business judgment. Otherwise, in
situations in which business considerations clearly dictate that they should not
attempt to recover the short-swing profits of an insider, they will be subject to personal
liability for breach of fiduciary duty for acting in the best interests of the corporation.
7 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
70 It is unclear what will be in issue when a shareholder brings an action ques-
tioning the validity of a compromise. The fact that it is permissible for the corpo-
ration to consider the probability of recovery if it were to bring an action, see Lewis
v. Rosenberg, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L, RFP. 90,856 (S.D.N.Y,
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court's concern would not be focused on the nature of the settle-
ment between the insider and the corporation but upon "punish-
ing" the insider for indulging in short-swing trading in the issuer's
securities, a course of conduct which has been legislatively declared
to be reprehensible to the public interest.77
The Business Judgment Rule will not always insulate the direc-
tors from personal liability, since if corporate officials abuse their
discretion to control the issuer's business practices and thereby cause
it to lose its claim against the insider, they will, under common law
principles, be guilty of "waste" of a corporate asset and thus of
breach of fiduciary duty owed to the corporation78 For example, if
the directors learn about possible insider short-swing activity and fail
to take any action, not only are they thwarting operation of the
statutory enforcement procedure, but they are also being negligent
in their capacity as fiduciary representatives of the corporation.79
1955), indicates that only the good-faith nature of the settlement should be in issue.
Thus, even though a settlement is for an amount substantially less than the alleged
profits realized by the insider, it should be approved by the court and should bar a
shareholder's action against the insider. Nevertheless, because of the unique enforce-
ment system under § 16 (b), indications exist that a good-faith compromise will not
always preclude further action by a security holder against the insider on behalf of the
issuer. See notes 72, 74 supra and accompanying text.
'171n permitting the shareholder to intervene in the issuer's suit against the in-
sider, the Pellegrino court recognized the "punitive" aspect of § 16 (b) and the often
unrealistic nature of an action by the corporation against an insider by asserting that
"once it [the issuer] commences litigation, the company's duty is not merely to deter-
mine diligently whether prosecution of the suit should continue, but, rather, the com-
pany has a duty diligently to prosecute the suit. A realistic approach to § 16 (b) liti-
gation requires recognition that a corporation will generally be reluctant to bring suit
against its own beneficial owners, directors or officers." Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203
F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
7 8See note 46 supra.
70 The court in Truncale indicated that more than inaction on the part of the
directors would be needed before they would be subject to personal liability. See note
46 supra. However, this conclusion is subject to attack. Although the language of
§ 16 (b) eliminates the necessity of a shareholder establishing an equitable basis upon
which to sue derivatively for the corporation, see note 74 supra and accompanying
text, nothing contained in the provision alters the substance of what action or
inaction by the directors will constitute a breach of fiduciary obligation to the issuer,
id. Therefore, if under local law mere failure to act in the context of other claims
which the corporation might have would lead to personal liability for the directors,
such precedent should govern when a § 16 (b) claim is in issue. Moreover, failure
to pursue a corporate claim when insufficient reasons weigh against prosecution does
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harris v.
Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921). See also N.Y. Bus. Coiu'. LAW
§ 720 (a) (1) (A) (McKinney 1963), which provides: "An action may be brought against
one or more directors or officers of a corporation to procure a judgment for the follow-
ing relief: (1) To compel the defendant to account for his official conduct in the
following cases: (A) The neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his
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They would seemingly at least owe a duty to the issuer and its share-
holders to investigate the claim and confront the insider with the
allegation. If the board chooses to do nothing, running of the
two-year statute of limitations under section 16 (b) will not insulate
the individual directors from liability; for their breach occurs only
at the time of the running of the statute of limitations on the 16 (b)
claim, that is, when no action has been taken and action thereafter,
due to their negligence, would be barred.
Finally, personal liability may attach to directors in situations in
which the liability of the insider is relatively clear, and a suit by a
shareholder to prosecute the claim on behalf of the corporation is
imminent, if the directors fail to take any action. If they refuse to
settle with the insider or to institute proceedings against him and
the shareholder subsequently recovers the insider's profits for the
benefit of the corporation, the directors arguably have breached their
fiduciary duty by permitting "waste" of the claim to the extent the
corporate recovery is reduced by payment of attorney's fees to the
shareholder's lawyer. The alleged breach would not be of the duty
to prosecute the claim in order to realize the corporate asset; rather,
it would be for failing to prosecute when it was readily apparent
that if they did not, the shareholder's attorney would commence a
derivative action, thereby diminishing the recovery that the corpora-
tion would realize.8 0
CONCLUSION
The considerations denominated "tactical" above gain legal
significance insofar as they affect the reasonableness of a managerial
judgment not to litigate or settle a section 16 (b) claim. However,
an overriding factor may be the existence of the statutorily-granted
remedy resting in most shareholders. Thus, not only does this
provision secure an independent action for the shareholder, but it
may also dilute the relevance of the Business Judgment Rule in the
16 (b) context. More important, perhaps, are the practical con-
siderations flowing from the possibility of a suit for breach of duty
for failure to consummate a 16 (b) claim. For instance, the dis-
enchanted shareholder gains a statute of limitations in addition to
duties in the management and disposition of corporate assets committed to his
charge."
so See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
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that provided under the Securities Exchange Act. Further, a group
of shareholders can have a broad selection of forums in both the
state and federal jurisdictions. If this analysis establishes one lesson
unequivocally, it is that with appropriate reactions the issuer can pre-
clude applicability of any procedure which frustrates managerial
control of the settlement of litigation.
G.R.M.
L.L.S.
